Interests

  • Zero-knowledge proofs for privacy-enhancing technologies
  • End-to-end encrypted messaging
  • Password authenticated key exchange
  • Lattice cryptography

Credits

  • Current maintainer of the Rust curve25519-dalek, ed25519-dalek, and x25519-dalek crates. In sum, these crates have millions of downstream users.
  • Listed contributor to the Message Layer Security (MLS) specification
  • Author and maintainer of the hpke-rs hybrid encryption crate, currently used in production at Cloudflare, 1Password, and the ISRG.

Publications (Semantic Scholar)

PAKE Combiners and Efficient Post-Quantum Instantiations [ePrint]

Julia Hesse, Michael Rosenberg

ZIPNet: Low-bandwidth anonymous broadcast from (dis)Trusted Execution Environments [ePrint]

Michael Rosenberg, Maurice Shih, Zhenyu Zhao, Rui Wang, Ian Miers, Fan Zhang

Anonymous Outsourced Statekeeping with Reduced Server Storage [ePrint]

Dana Dachman-Soled, Esha Ghosh, Mingyu Liang, Ian Miers, Michael Rosenberg

zk-promises: Making Zero-Knowledge Objects Accept the Call and Applications to Anonymous Access Control

Maurice Shih, Michael Rosenberg, Ian Miers

Hekaton: Horizontally-Scalable zkSNARKs via Proof Aggregation [ePrint]

Michael Rosenberg, Tushar Mopuri, Hossein Hafezi, Ian Miers, Pratyush Mishra

LATKE: A Framework for Constructing Identity-Binding PAKEs [ePrint]

Jonathan Katz, Michael Rosenberg

zk-creds: Flexible Anonymous Credentials from zkSNARKs and Existing Identity Infrastructure [ePrint]

Michael Rosenberg, Jacob White, Christina Garman, Ian Miers

SNARKBlock: Federated Anonymous Blocklisting from Hidden Common Input Aggregate Proofs [ePrint]

Michael Rosenberg, Mary Maller, Ian Miers

Labeled PSI from Homomorphic Encryption with Reduced Computation and Communication [ePrint]

Kelong Cong, Radames Cruz Moreno, Mariana Botelho da Gama, Wei Dai, Ilia Iliashenko, Kim Laine, and Michael Rosenberg

Boosting the Security of Blind Signature Schemes [ePrint]

Jonathan Katz, Julian Loss, Michael Rosenberg

Libraries’ Approaches to the Security of Public Computers [PDF]

Samuel Dooley, Michael Rosenberg, Elliott Sloate, Sungbok Shin, Michelle Mazurek